Decentralization of Local Administration in Japan, China, South Korea, India, Singapore and Pakistan

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Abstract: This study evaluates how decentralization can enhance service delivery in Asia provided appropriate political and financial institutions are in place. Stated differently, decentralization presents both a challenge and an opportunity. After outlining the key features of decentralized governance in Asia, the paper analyzes the key problems that lead to "partial decentralization," which is a feature of most models. Examining the role of local governments in decentralizing the authority and power of the federal or state governments and bringing development to the grassroots level is the specific goal of this study. The descriptive study was based on efficiency and democratic-participatory theories and used both primary and secondary sources of data. The new issues that most Asian systems face are also taken into account. The paper concludes by discussing the problem of decentralization in the field of education. Although it is challenging to evaluate the effects of decentralization, this is an important sector in terms of costliness, impact on national growth, and individual prospects. In addition to ensuring effective public goods and services delivery and active democracy at the local level, it was suggested that State Governments give Local Governments administrative and budgetary autonomy.

Keywords: Decentralization, local administrative system, south Korea, Japan, China, Singapore, India, Pakistan.

Introduction

Asian nations exhibit nearly every type of decentralized governing arrangement imaginable. Unitary systems (Republic of Korea), regional systems of governance (Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines), de jure federal systems (India and Pakistan), facto quasi-federal systems (People's Republic of China [PRC], despite classification objections), and finally partially (Thailand) or largely deconcentrated systems (Cambodia and Viet Nam) are among the nations. Additionally, nations differ greatly in common measures of fiscal decentralization, such as the proportion of subnational spending to overall general government spending. With nearly 70% of general government spending occurring at the subnational level, the PRC looks to be the most decentralized nation in the world by this metric, while Nepal appears to be among the least decentralized with only 9%.

In terms of analyzing and assessing intergovernmental relations, India and the PRC are nearly diametrically opposed. Every Chinese province and every Indian state is so large that they have thousands of subordinate units under them. Each of these states has created a unique system of intergovernmental relations that is hard to assess in a single paper, formally known as the Panchayati Raj reform in India and less formally known as the PRC.

Nearly all Asian nations are attempting—and intending to—decentralize. On the other hand, procedures with broad objectives are either in the early stages or are moving extremely slowly. In the cases of Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, the goal of reform is to substitute political decentralization for deconcentration. Only a few processes (in Japan and Indonesia) that were initiated in the past 20 years are nearly finished.

Decentralization is akin to a pendulum; governments frequently reevaluate the benefits of power devolution and transfer some duties to the center (like in the Philippines).

Piecemeal reform applied to different aspects of decentralized governance appears to be the dominant paradigm. The goal of Japan's most recent reform has been to increase subnational tax authority. In India, the introduction of value-added tax (VAT) can also operate in this direction. There are also some centripetal moves, such as the partial recentralization of education in the PRC or the suppression of elected local councils in Pakistan since 2008.

After a number of reforms, the institutions of decentralized governance in at least one Asian country (Japan) are currently meeting almost all of the criteria recommended by the theory and best practices.

It is probable that local officials have not yet taken full use of the prospects for improved service delivery. The expectations could only be verified by study of successful results. The findings of a very recent empirical literature review on service delivery in Asia (Ghuman and Singh 2013) are not entirely clear. Following a rigorous selection process, 32 studies that take into account the primary facets of decentralization—such as service accessibility, provision efficiency, and quality enhancement—were the focus of the analysis. According to the analysis, decentralization has a favorable effect on public service delivery in 13 of the 32 sample studies. Eleven studies have found that decentralization has a detrimental influence, whereas eight studies have found mixed results. This is not shocking. However, broad generalizations are

not possible due to the various approaches used in the examined studies.

The theory and best practices can help you get the most out of decentralized governance, but they can't guarantee that it's better than other forms of government. Lack of capability at the local level can occasionally make it more difficult to profit from decentralization. Developing capacity is something that governments frequently overlook.

Decentralized administration in Asia faces many issues that are similar to those in other parts of the world, such as the region's increased natural resource abundance or susceptibility to natural disasters. The necessity to establish subnational tax autonomy in a region that has historically relied on a comparatively low tax burden is one example of an issue that has a unique intensity in Asia. The literature offers unified recommendations for certain difficulties, while review and recommendations are still in the early stages for others.

These factors influence the paper's format, which begins with a methodological section that focuses on definition and approach. Section III presents the salient characteristics of decentralized government in Asia and section IV is devoted to the analysis of critical issues leading to "partial decentralization" common to most models. The rather large section V concerns the emerging challenges.

Section VI presents a few solutions to emerging structural problems of intergovernmental relations, such as asymmetric federalism and contracting. Section VII provides an empirical analysis of decentralization in the education sector. In fact, education could provide a convenient ground for the analysis of the effective outcomes of decentralization. There are, however, enormous limitations in the availability of the information needed to conduct meaningful cross-country comparisons.

A common denominator of the analysis in the paper is the stress on the fact that improvements in outcomes, especially in terms of service delivery, do not depend on the intensity of decentralization policies, but rather on their quality, meaning above all their capacity to promote local accountability.

Objectives of the Study:

This research paper work is an attempt to study the new local government system in Pakistan, south Korea, India, China, Japan and Singapore. This study places a great deal of importance on the impact assessment of decentralization measures. Relevant contributions of these reforms, such as improvements in service delivery and political representation at lower levels, have been studied. In order to help pave the path for the future, the initial complexity and ambiguous policy framework are examined. Decentralization's effects are interconnected and mostly dependent on one another. Therefore, the main goal of the study is to analyze any such enhancements or alterations. It's likely that this study will raise new issues and questions, which will lead to more research in the suggested field of study.

Scope and Limitations of the Study:

There aren't many reliable reports on the effects of decentralization in Pakistan, South Korea, India, China, Japan, and Singapore because the local government system was only recently implemented. It is too soon to tell whether the new system, which was implemented in August 2001, has succeeded in accomplishing

its goals. Nonetheless, there are a few studies and publications that can inform us about the evolving patterns in the creation and provision of services.

Review of Related Literature

Conceptual Clarification

Concept of Decentralisation

The national capitals of Nigeria, Britain, Ghana, France, and Russia are, as you may remember, Abuja, London, Accra, Paris, and Moscow, respectively. Depending on the political structure that the nation has chosen, a state may have different levels of capital, or tiers.

In a federal state, we have state or regional capitals in addition to the national capital. For example, there are thirty-six (36) state capitals of Nigeria in addition to Abuja. The necessity of implementing a federal arrangement is typically informed by national diversities.

A nation's size in terms of geographic dispersion may also necessitate a lower level of government in order to facilitate government operations and expedite service delivery. Therefore, in order to promote efficiency and administrative comforts, modern governments delegate authority and power to lower levels.

Osaghae (1990: 84) defines decentralization as a system of power distribution from a central government to other governmental units or agencies. This suggests that the current tiers of government share power and authority rather than having them centralized in one place. Higher levels of government bear less responsibility when power is decentralized. The corresponding higher levels of government may not be concerned with all that occurs.

Decentralization is the process by which intermediate and local administrative units receive more authority, responsibility, power, and resources from the central government. The modes can be categorized as de-concentration, delegating, or devolution, depending on the type of decentralization. Dispersing authority to lower levels within central line ministries or agencies is known as de-concentration (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The 1970s and 1980s saw the greatest adoption of de-concentration as a decentralization strategy (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Transferring power and accountability for administration and decision-making to the central government's partially independent entities is known as delegation. The mid-1980s saw a surge in delegation (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). *Devolution* is transfer of authority to lower tiers or sub-national units of the central government for decision making, finance and management (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Johnson, 2003; Sharma, 2006). Devolution emerged as a popular mode of decentralization in the mid 1980s.

Decentralization Decentralization is the shifting of authority from the central government to local level authorities, granting them relative autonomy and increased resources, along with the new responsibilities. It has been defined by various writers in numerous ways. But most of the writers on decentralization would agree that it involves delegation of authority, shifting of resources, and relative autonomy to lower tiers. B. C. Smith (1985:1) defines decentralization as 'the delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the hierarchy is one

of governments within a state or offices within a large scale organization'.

Devolution, according to Manor (1999:6), is the transfer of authority and resources to lower level authorities that are mostly or entirely independent of higher levels of government, which are somewhat democratic. In addition to democratic elections, the term takes into account the results of greater accountability, responsiveness, and participation.

The transfer of planning, decision-making, and administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments, or non-governmental organizations is known as decentralization, according to Rondenelli and Cheema (1983). Furthermore, they contend that the degree to which the central government transfers planning, decision-making, and management authority to other organizations, as well as the degree of autonomy attained by these decentralized organizations in performing their duties, are the primary distinguishing factors among various forms of decentralization.

Bardhan (1997) takes a distinct stance on decentralization. He makes a distinction between administrative delegation of central government responsibilities to local branches and decentralization in the sense of devolution of political decision making. Additionally, he distinguishes between the 12 aspects of fiscal decentralization and the political and administrative aspects of decentralization. He warns that not all of these decentralization-related factors work at the same time in any given situation and that it's possible that an economy is decentralized in certain areas but not in others.

Aaron Schneider has separated decentralization into three categories: political, administrative, and fiscal (2003:33). According to him 'decentralized systems are those in which central entities play a lesser role in any or all of these dimensions. In such systems, central governments possess a smaller share of fiscal resources, grant more administrative autonomy, and/or cede a higher degree of responsibility for political functions.

Devolution:

Devolution is the total transfer of powers and resources from the central government to the local units. Devolution is considered to be the strongest form of decentralization because it implies the complete transfer of administrative authority to the sub-national or regional governments (Katsiaouni, 2003). It enables the local authority to formulate policy and implement decisions on their own initiative without recourse to the central government.

Deconcentration

While devolution is the complete ceding of authority to the local governments on local subjects deconcentration is only the shifting of functions and resources including personnel from the centre to other locations. The logic behind deconcentration is that decisions can be made on the spot by the bureaucrats who are ultimately responsible to the centre. In this way more employment opportunities are created at the local level and services are delivered more efficiently while the centre still retains the power.

Delegation

Delegation is the transfer of functions and authority to semi-autonomous bodies or public enterprises. It implies transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities or a variety of activities within specific spatial boundaries to an organization that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without direct supervision by a bigger administrative unit (Rondenelli, A. and Cheema, S. 1983). The purpose of delegation is to bypass the central bureaucracy and avoid the day-to-day controls in running the new enterprise.

Concept of Local Government:

Local government is therefore defined by the United Nations document on public administration as a "political sub-division of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs, including the power to impose taxes or to enact prescribed bye-laws" (Ajayi, 2000:1).

The 1976 Local Government Reforms Guidelines also defined local government as "government at local level exercised through representative council established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas".

Very clear from these interpretations is the acknowledgement that local government is a government at the local level, established by law to perform specific functions within defined areas or jurisdiction. The definitions also reveal that local government is a lower-tier of government depending on the political arrangements in place.

Therefore, in a federal system, local government is the third-tier level of government while in a unitary, and non-federal states, local government takes the place of second-tier level of government.

Local government is also regarded as grassroots government for, it is the closest to the rural people, and in most cases, it is the most known level of government to the rural areas where most citizens live, particularly in the developing world where rural dwellers account for about 70% of the national population.

Local government is grassroots government recognised by law. It is defined severally by authors and bodies. Let us look at the definition of local government from the perspective of one author and two bodies or documents.

Maddick (1963) defines local government as 'a sub-unit of government controlled by a local council which is authorised by the central government to pass ordinances having a local application, levy taxes or exact labour on the limits specified by the central government'. The United Nations Article of Declaration (1948) defines local government as 'a political sub-division of a nation (or in a federal system, or state) which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs, including the power to impose taxes or to exert labour for prescribed purposes. The governing body of such an entity is elected or otherwise locally selected'.

The Nigeria Local Government Reform document (1976) defines local government as 'government at a local level exercised by representative council, established by law to exercise specific power within defined areas'. From the three definitions above, certain characteristic of local government stands out:

➢ the local government is a subordinate system of government

> ➢ it has both legal and constitutional power to perform certain legislative, administrative and quasi judicial function
> ➢ has the power to make policies, prepare budgets and a measure of control over its own staff
> ➢ its council could be elected or selected
> ➢ it has legal personality (can sue and be sued)
> ➢ It exercises authority over a given territory or population.

These definitions point to local government as having government character with limited powers. This can be further broken down more specifically as follows:

> ➢ Legal entity which can sue and be sued for wrong doings
> ➢ Power to make its own laws, policies, plans and budgets on what to do, how, why, where and when, for who and at what cost
> ➢ Legislative body called a council composed of elected councilors and a chairman to make laws and policies
> ➢ Executive body called the committee composed of appointed or elected officials and the chairman to formulate policies and laws
> ➢ Administrative body called the local government services, composed of career civil servant to assist in formulating and in implementing laws and policies
> ➢ Power to tap human, financial and material resources for public use within the geographical area
> ➢ Answerable to a higher level of government (national or state or regional) on certain powers and functions it carries out (especially concurrent function). This is to say that a local government is not absolutely autonomous but semi-autonomous.

Conceptual Framework: Conceptual Discussion

Decentralization and Development of Local Administrative Institutions:

Decentralization is regarded, today, as a panacea for most of the problems being faced by the developing world. There is a long list of the problems faced by developing world which decentralization is said to be able to address like delivery of public services, poverty reduction, participation, integration, etc. This development burden which is placed on decentralization according to Smith (1983) is too great for it to bear and Third World countries who find much promise in decentralization are often disappointed by the results which fall short of these expectations.

A large volume of theoretical arguments have been deployed to make the case that greater decentralization within the state will assist poorer countries to develop more rapidly, reduce poverty at the local level and facilitate provision of basic social services.

Smith (1983) categorizes the benefits of decentralization in six forms which include political education, training in political leadership, political stability, political equality, and accountability and responsiveness. Some of these benefits like political education and leadership training are rarely mentioned these days as benefits of decentralization. The emphasis that we see today is on accountability and responsiveness argument of decentralization which is seen as improving the quality of services delivered by state. Political participation and political stability are also commonly cited political benefits of decentralization claimed by contemporary national leaders (Turner and Hulme, 1997).

Similarly, Rondenelli (1981) cites specific benefits that may be gained from decentralizing authority and resources to lower levels.

Another theoretical argument for decentralization is that it improves participation of the people. In a decentralized political system citizens have more opportunities to participate in political decision making since the whole process of decision making is broken down to smaller units. Decentralized state apparatus therefore provides more access and control over the bureaucracy for its citizens than a centralized one. Ahmed J. et al (2005) elaborate this point of accountability. By devolving responsibility for public services to local level, according to them, means that politicians who are responsible are now locally elected. This would make them more accountable to the people as they can monitor them more closely and attribute changes in service quality to them more easily. This creates a web of accountability i.e. the accountability of local politicians to the citizens, service provider's accountability to the local politicians and of the local politicians to the policy makers at the centre. Azfar (2001) argues that devolving authority to the local level reduces corruption and brings productive efficiency in the government as sub-national governments are closer to the people where citizens are considered to be more aware of the actions of government than of the central government. Although Manor (2002) disagrees with him who says that it has limited promise in reducing corruption and absenteeism.

Manor (2002) asserts that decentralization enhances the uptake and thus the impact on health, education and environmental programmes. The reason of the impact in these areas is that decentralization makes it possible to adapt such programmes to local conditions and preferences. It also provides a framework to replicate development success from one arena into many others. Although, according to him, it has only limited utility in alleviating poverty and promoting economic growth, but by opening the policy and political processes to ordinary citizens it can do much to enhance their well being and to make their livelihoods and development more sustainable. He also has set some essential conditions for the success of decentralization in all these areas. These conditions are that decentralized authorities must be provided with adequate funds to accomplish important tasks; powers to make decisions required to complete such tasks; and reliable accountability mechanism to ensure both the accountability of elected representatives to citizens and the accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives.

Paul Francis et al (2003) assert that decentralization is considered to be a cornerstone of good governance in promoting local accountability and transparency and in enforcing local participation, leading to improved efficiency of public service provision and more appropriate services for the poor.

Asante (2003) explains the link between decentralization, poverty reduction and service delivery through a diagram (Figure-1). The diagram shows that decentralization empowers the people and assures their participation in decision-making which would in turn make the representatives more responsive to the needs of the poor. Empowerment and participation have three-fold implications: control over the local statutory bodies, increased influence of the citizens over state institutions and, most importantly improved public goods and services provisions. The overall outcome is promotion of development and alleviation of the many common causes of poverty.

Decentralization in Local Administrative Practice

The practice of decentralization around the world shows mixed results. In some countries decentralization has been successful while in others it has failed to have any positive effects on improving service delivery and poverty reduction. The overall performance of decentralization is not as good as the arguments made in the theory. One of the reasons for the poor performance is that decentralization is not implemented with intentions of better service delivery and development but to achieve political goals like central control and political stability.

Bardhan (2002) cautions that although decentralization experiments are going on in many developing countries, hard quantitative evidence on their impact is rather scarce. He cites two successful cases of decentralization in Latin America for service delivery outcomes. One is the case of participatory budgeting in municipal government in Porto Alegre in Brazil, and another is the post 1994 decentralization initiatives in Bolivia. According to the first study, Porto Alegre has impressive results following assembly meetings of local citizens and neighboring associations in different regions where they discuss investment priorities, review accounts and allocate available resources across wards. Between 1998 and 1996, access to basic sanitation as well as enrolment in elementary and secondary schools nearly doubled, while revenue collection increased by 48 %. And in Bolivia, in 1994, the number of municipalities, as well as the share of national tax revenue allocated to municipalities, doubled, along with devolution to the municipalities of administrative authority, investment responsibility and title to local infrastructural facilities.

Jutting et al's (2004) research in 19 developing countries shows that decentralization had negative or somewhat negative effects on the two third of these countries. While only one third of these countries showed some positive signs on improved developments after decentralization. The successful cases include, Bolivia, Philippines, India (West Bengal), China, Ghana South Africa and Mexico; and, among the worst cases include, Guinea, Mozambique, Malawi, India (Andhra Pradesh), India (Madhya Pradesh). In countries like Bolivia, Philippines and India (West Bengal) responsiveness to the needs of poor was very good. Because of reduction in voicelessness overall participation of public increased. More indigenous people were represented although the gender gap was not tackled seriously. Living conditions of the poor in these countries improved because of overall development and good infrastructure. In countries with large rural population agrarian reforms were carried out which left good impacts on the rural poor. Decentralization according to them is successful in these countries because it is generally supported by the government. The government has the ability and willingness to carry out reforms. The literacy rate in these countries is over 80%. These are generally less indebted and middle or lower middle income countries. All these factors contributed to the successful impacts of decentralization on poverty and service delivery in these countries.

On the other hand the worst cases have had no or very little impact on poverty reduction of any of the decentralization programme. In these countries 'the overriding objective of the decentralization programme is political stability and the maintenance of central control through deconcentration rather than effective devolution. …..decentralization in these countries is not designed for its benefits in terms of democratization, greater responsiveness to local needs and community participation' (Jutting et al, 2004:16). All these countries are highly indebted and their infrastructure is very poor. The literacy rate in these countries is under 50%.

The failure of decentralization in these countries is because they do not meet the conditions essential for it. The intentions behind decentralization have not been the economic and social development of the people but consolidating the power of the military or non-military dictator.

Richard Crook (2001) asserts that though decentralization increased participation of the people in elections in South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire but the responsiveness to the needs of the people on the part of officials is still very low. Decentralization in these countries has no impact on development and growth because the funding from the centre to the local government is only a fraction of the GNP. According to him in none of these countries, "Decentralization will empower any real challenge to local elites who are resistant to or uninterested in development to pro-poor policies, except possibly South Africa, if the regime sees a political advantage in using local government for this purpose. On the contrary in most of the African cases 'elite capture' of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the countryside" (ibid, 2001:86).

Van Braun and Grote (2000) find some positive impacts of decentralization in war torn societies like Ethiopia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Uganda and South Africa. In Ethiopia decentralization has played a great role in reducing the secessionist tendencies. In Bosnia & Herzegovina it has provided an institutionalized mechanism for bringing the divided groups into a rule bound bargaining process. In Uganda and South Africa decentralization has paved the path for peace. In the absence of such a mechanism it would have been difficult to bring peace in these multi-ethnic societies where people belonging to one ethnic group would not trust another group to hold all the powers. This has also impacted on development because violence and conflicts is one of the causes for underdevelopment and public services. Absolute poverty expressed in terms of hunger is concentrated in countries affected by internal wars and conflicts. Although decentralization is not a panacea for bringing peace and sometimes, it may even exacerbate violence between two groups, but it can at least provide rule bound mechanism which is likely to lead to peace.

Decentralisation of Local Administration in Singapore, Japan, China, Parkistan India And South Korea

The theoretical roots of decentralization can be traced from the 'Tiebout Hypothesis'. Charles Tiebout in 1956 propounded that different local governments offer different goods and services to its residents in lieu of taxes. Keeping this in view people move to those local government jurisdictions which approximate their preferences for local services. In this manner the heterogeneous local governments succeed in partially solving the problem of efficient provision of local services (Moroney, 2008).

Consequently building upon the Tiebout Hypothesis, Wallace Oates in 1972 developed the "Decentralization Theorem" which states, "for a public good- the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or for the respective

local government- it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local government to provide the *pareto-efficient* level of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions" (Oates, 2006).

Decentralized service delivery mechanisms are also justified over centralized service mechanisms theoretically in terms of promotion of equity, efficiency, effectiveness and innovation (Bossert & Beauvais, 2002; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Decentralization induces competition amongst the local units for the provision of services by accommodating local needs and preferences through better information channels and access at the local level, which is not possible in the centralized service provision which often follow the dictum of one size fits all (Asthana, 2008; Oates, 2006). Decentralization leads to improvement in quality by enhancing accountability and transparency through people's participation and monitoring of decision-making and service provision processes. The inclusion of marginalized and backward sections in various activities helps in accommodating their voices and priorities for service delivery and ensures equity.

Globalization policies, the growing role of market and civil society in the decisions regarding provision of public services have made the concept of decentralization broader in the backdrop of transition from government to governance. Now decentralization is interpreted beyond the transfer of authority within government; and thus includes the sharing of power, authority and responsibility among all the stakeholders especially local community in local governance (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

The management and administrative reforms grounded in the theories such as public choice, principal-agent and transaction cost economics under the umbrella of New Public Management (NPM) have also significantly influenced the theory and practice of decentralization (Mitchell & Bossert, 2010). According to Levy, "It would be generally agreed that an NPM-style reform process encompasses the embrace of private sector management norms and values including a focus on customers and a belief in market mechanisms, the fragmentation and decentralization of public services, and the transformation of working practices within them.... This contrasts with a traditional Weberian model of public administration which is instinctively centralist, bound by procedures and rules, focused on bureaucracy and legality, and driven by an ethos of public service" (Levy, 2002).

In brief Cheema and Rondinelli have succinctly captured the evolving concept of decentralization as, "… the transfer of authority, responsibility and resources through de-concentration, delegation or devolution from the centre to lower level of administration … As the concept governance became more inclusive, decentralization took a new meaning and new forms…. We trace the transformation and evolution of concepts and practices of decentralization from the transfer of authority within government to sharing of power, authority and responsibilities among broader governance institutions" (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

Local Government Administration In Singapore

SINGAPORE

Capital	Singapore 1°17′N 103°50′E
Official languages	English Chinese Malay Tamil
National language	Malay
Ethnic groups (2019)	Expand List of ethnicities
Religion (2015)	Expand List of religions
Demonym(s)	Singaporean
Government	Unitary dominant- party parliamentary constitutional republic
President	Tharman Shanmugaratnam
Prime Minister	Lawrence Wong
Chief Justice	Sundaresh Menon
Parliament Speaker	Seah Kian Peng
Legislature	Parliament
Independence from the United Kingdom and Malaysia	
Self-governance	3 June 1959

Malaysia Agreement	16 September 1963
Proclamation of Singapore	9 August 1965
ASEAN Declaration	8 August 1967

Area	
Total	731.0 km^2 (282.2 sq mi) (176th)

Population	
2019 estimate	▲ 5,703,600 (115th)
Density	7,804/km^2 (20,212.3/sq mi) (2nd)

GDP (PPP)	2020 estimate
Total	▲ $615.698 billion (36th)
Per capita	▲ $107,604 (3rd)

GDP (nominal)	2020 estimate
Total	▲ $391.875 billion (31st)
Per capita	▲ $68,487 (7th)

Gini (2017)	▬ 45.9 medium

HDI (2019)	▲ 0.938 very high · 11th

Currency	Singapore dollar (S$) (SGD)
Time zone	UTC+8 (Singapore Standard Time)
Date format	dd/mm/yyyy
Mains electricity	230 V–50 Hz
Driving side	left
Calling code	+65
ISO 3166 code	SG
Internet TLD	.sg

Government type

Parliamentary republic

Independence

9 August 1965 (from Malaysian Federation)

Constitution

3 June 1959; amended 1965 (based on pre Independence State of Singapore Constitution)

Legal system

Based on English common law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

In 1819, Singapore was established as a trading station by Sir Stamford Raffles under an agreement between the British East India Company and the Sultan of Johor and the Malay ruler of the island. In 1824, Singapore was ceded in perpetuity to the East India Company by the Sultan. During World War II, Singapore was occupied by the Japanese from 1942 to 1945. Following the

surrender of Japan, Singapore was re-occupied by the Allied Forces. In August 1958, the State of Singapore Act was passed in the United Kingdom Parliament providing for the establishment of the State of Singapore. Singapore achieved internal self-government on 3 June 1959. On 1 September 1962, 73 percent of the electorate voted in favour of merger with Malaysia. Singapore became a part of the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. The union was short-lived and Singapore separated from Malaysia on 9 August 1965 becoming a fully independent and sovereign nation. Singapore consists of the main island of Singapore and some 63 offshore islands.

The main island is about 42 kilometres from east to west and 23 kilometres from north to south. Singapore's total land area, including that of the smaller islands, is 697.1 square kilometres. The official languages in Singapore are Malay, Chinese (Mandarin), Tamil and English. Malay is the national language and English is language of administration. The Singapore civil service is one of the most efficient and least corrupt in the world with some of the highest paid civil servants. The Singapore Government

holds the view that this will eliminate corruption both at the political and civil service level. This high-wage structure was introduced in the early to mid 1990s where civil service salaries are pegged to the private sector. Furthermore, the Public Service Division

(PSD) of the Prime Minister's Office was set-up in 1995 to nurture a culture of change in Public Service.

Legal basis

Part IX of the constitution "the Public service" outlines the work of the civil service (Article 102-119). It has three titles respectively; public service commission; special service commissions; and pensions, proceedings. There is also the Public Service Commission act (Chapter 259) established in 1956 and revived in 1970 and 1985. It was further amended in 1994.

Recruitment

The appointment of all civil servants, except to the Administrative Service, was devolved from the Public Service Commission (PSC) and other Commissions to Personnel Boards in Ministries. This is to give line managers greater authority and flexibility in personnel management functions. There are 3 levels of personnel boards: Special Personnel Board, Senior Personnel Board and Personnel Board; each taking charge of different divisions of officers. Policies on recruitment continue to be set by the Public Service Division (PSD) of the Prime Minister's Office. Open selection is stressed in the recruitment of candidates to the Civil Service. Selection criteria for appointment are firstly based on educational qualifications. Ministries may draw up their own objective criteria to further shortlist applicants from amongst those who satisfy the entry requirements. The short listing criteria are approved by the Director of Personnel of the respective Ministries. All applicants who satisfy the short listing criteria have to be short listed and interviewed by an interview panel, who will recommend the candidates to the Personnel Boards for appointment.

The PSD coordinates a mass recruitment exercise for graduates once a year. Career talks are conducted at the universities prior to the recruitment press advertisements. The main aim is green-harvesting, ie: To recruit the better graduates by reaching out to them before they graduate. Other than these yearly co-ordinated recruitment exercises, Ministries conduct their own recruitment as and when the need arises. The recruitment process includes the following: (a) Inviting applications through press advertisements; (b) Shortlisting candidates based on objective criteria; (c) Interviewing shortlisted candidates; and (d) Recommending selected candidates to the Personnel Boards for appointment.

Promotion

Promotions are based on a appraisal system of the Singapore Civil Service consists of two components, which are Reporting System and Performance Ranking System. Reporting System is an annual written reports and consists of three parts: (a) An assignment worksheet to allow the Reporting Officer and his subordinate to discuss and agree on the work assignments and training plan for the year ahead and to set milestone dates for conducting periodic work reviews; (b) An open work Review Report to record the views of the Reporting Officer and his subordinate on the subordinate's achievements and progress during the period under review. It is an important tool for counseling the officer on his work and how it can be improved; and (c) A

confidential Development Report to assess the officer's overall performance, character traits, and to recommend training and development possibilities.

Performance Ranking System is an overlays system of individual annual reports. It serves to resolve differences in standards between various supervisors and includes factors such as quality of work, output organizational ability, knowledge and application, reaction under stress, teamwork and sense of responsibility. The ranking panel will rank the officers based on their assessment of the officers' relative standing vis-à-vis each other in descending order of performance. To facilitate ranking, the panel could first broadly band them (The members should be able to identify the very good ones and the not so good ones from the average without too

much difficulty), and thereafter determine the specific positions of individuals, Members of the panel should cite specific example of individuals' work to justify their positions in the group. After the relative ranking is confirmed, the panel would then look for natural breaks for the purpose of assigning specific performance grades.

Remuneration

Since 1988, the Civil Service has moved towards a flexible wage system. It includes two annual salary components, the Non-Pensionable Annual Allowance (NPAA), and the Annual Variable Component (AVC), which can be varied depending on national economic performance. In addition, should economic growth for the year significantly exceed mid-year forecasts, a oneoff lump-sum payment or Special Bonus may be paid. In the mid 1990s, a high-wage structure was introduced where civil service salaries are pegged to the private sector. For pensionable officers, the monthly salary consists of a pensionable component, which attracts partial CPF contributions, and a non-pensionable component, on which full CPF is paid. The Government decided in 1993 that subsequent salary increases would be made non-pensionable, so as to limit the pensions burden on future generations.

Training

Public sector employees in Singapore are trained in a number of ways. Since its founding in March 1971, the Civil Service Institute (CSI) has served as the primary training institution for the Singapore Civil Service, offering more than 900 courses to more than 20,000 students each year. The development of management, supervisory, and operational abilities was CSI's responsibility. In January 1993, the Civil Service College (CSC) was established. It was founded to promote leadership in the public sector with an emphasis on policy development training.

In order to provide a single central training facility for the Singapore Civil Service, the Civil Service Institute (CSI) and the Civil Service College (CSC) merged on April 1, 1996. The merged entity is known as the "Civil Service College". It has three components: the Institute of Policy Development (IPD), the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM), and the Civil Service Consulting Group (CSCG).

The executive branch of government, which is composed of the president and the Cabinet of Singapore, is referred to as the Government of Singapore by the Constitution of Singapore. The president's position is primarily ceremonial, even if they exercise their personal discretion in carrying out some duties as a check on

the Singaporean Parliament and Cabinet. The prime minister and other ministers chosen by the president on their recommendation make up the Cabinet, which typically leads and regulates the government. The political party that wins a simple majority in each general election forms the Cabinet.

An independent government agency created by a parliamentary act and supervised by a government ministry is known as a statutory board. Statutory boards operate more independently and flexibly than ministries and government departments that are divisions of ministries because they are not manned by civil servants. In Singapore, the People's Association (PA) board of management appoints five Community Development Councils (CDCs) for each district.

The origins of the present system of local governance in Singapore can be traced back to the increasing complexities involved in the provision of public housing that accommodates a substantial majority of citizens. On 1 February 1960, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) was established as a statutory board of the Ministry of National Development to improve on the hitherto unsatisfactory rate of large-scale public housing construction. The two main goals of the HDB's establishment were to manage public housing and supply sufficient accommodation, mostly in the form of apartments, for lower- and middle-income people. But with over half a million apartments offered throughout the HDB's first 25 years of existence, it had grown more difficult to provide proper management services. It was stated that this had led to "a lack of opportunities for public housing residents to participate in the management of their own estates and to establish a sense of belonging and identity," even while there were benefits to having a single huge corporation provide these services. Consequently, a system of town councils, each responsible for overseeing their respective estates, was established. The rationale for the establishment of town councils thus appears to have been two-fold, with the twin aims of "'educating' public housing residents and inculcating more responsibility among voters as well as an effort at decentralizing the management of public housing estates".

On 1 September 1984, three pilot town councils were created. Their success led directly to the Town Councils Act (TCA) of 1988 that formed the legislative basis for a fully-fledged system of town councils across Singapore. The new system emerged in three distinct phases: 9 Phase I councils were created in November 1988; 9 Phase II councils came into being in July 1989; and 9 Phase III councils materialized in July 1990. By March 1991, town councils had assumed management of all public housing estates (Ooi 1997). However, by 1997, the number of councils had been pared back to 16.

A. Branches of Government

With three distinct branches—the Legislature, which includes the President and Parliament; the Executive, which includes Cabinet Ministers and office holders and is headed by the Prime Minister; and the Judiciary—Singapore's government is modeled after the Westminster system. The laws of the land are made by the Legislature. The law is administered by the Executive. The courts are used by the judiciary to interpret the law.

The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and the President is the Head of State.

Being unicameral, the Parliament of Singapore has only one House. The Members of Parliament (MPs) are voted in at regular General Elections. The leader of the political party that secures the majority of seats in Parliament will be asked by the President to become the Prime Minister (PM). The PM will then select his Ministers from elected MPs to form the Cabinet.

Election of Speaker of Parliament

When the new Parliament meets for the first time after a General Election, the Speaker will be elected. The "life" of each Parliament is 5 years from the date of its first meeting or Sitting. A General Election must be held within 3 months of the dissolution of Parliament.

The New York Times described the Singapore model as "a mix of semi-authoritarian, one-party rule; meticulous urban planning; laissez-faire economic policies; low taxes; and heaps of imported foreign talent." The Singapore model is highly centralized and meritocratic, with government officials appointed to their jobs based on skill and performance rather than elected. As a result, the government runs efficiently and rationally. Singapore has almost no corruption in an area of the world where corruption often runs rampant. Singapore's development and its place in the emerging world order involves the following below;

Under the PAP, the government has taken a central role in promoting business. Singapore has many nationalized companies across a variety of industries. Moreover, the government has kept taxes low and regulations minimal to encourage private businesses; and it has actively sought out foreign investment, by providing incentives for entrepreneurs seeking to do business in Singapore.

Singapore's Constitution is the supreme law of the land, meaning that the legal principles laid down in the Constitution cannot be overridden by another law.

The Constitution serves as the foundation for Singapore's three-branch political system, which consists of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Additionally, it outlines the duties and authority of those three branches. Because of the division of powers established by the three branches of government, each one is able to serve as a check on the authority of the other two. The Constitution also outlines the fundamental freedoms that every Singaporean is entitled to, such as:

Basic rights associated with criminal procedure Right to not be enslaved or forced into labor Protection against retrospective criminal laws and multiple trials Freedom of speech, assembly and association Equal protection for every citizen under the law Freedom to choose your religion Equal educational opportunities.

B. Types of Executive

Legislative

The legislative branch is charged with making the laws. In Singapore, the legislative branch is the Parliament led by the Prime Minister.

Parliament

In Singapore, the Parliament has three main functions:

Debate and draft the country's laws Control the country's budget and finances Monitor and the actions of the governing political party and the Ministries through inquisitions. Most

Members of Parliament are elected by General Election, but not all. There are three types of Members of Parliament:

Elected (MPs)

- ➢ Non-Constituency (NCMPs)
- ➢ Nominated (NMPs)

MPs are elected by General Election and have full rights to debate and vote on any bill presented in the Parliament. NCMPs, often referred to as the "best losers", are the best performing losing candidates from an opposition party that won no seats in the General Election. NCMPs have many of the rights as Elected MPs, but not all. NMPs are nominated by a Special Select Committee and appointed by the President to a 28-month term in the Parliament. NMPs are not affiliated with a political party and do not represent the public. NMPs are industry experts or individuals who have rendered great service to Singapore. NMPs can take part in all debates, and vote on limited types of bills.

Each cycle of the Parliament lasts five years, although the Prime Minister can dissolve the Parliament at any time. A new General Election must be held within three months of dissolving a Parliament.

The Executive

The Executive branch is charged with the administration of the government. It manages its day-to-day operations from the highest levels at the Cabinet to the civil servants who serve average Singapore citizens.

The Cabinets

The Cabinet is the heart of the Executive branch of government. The Prime Minister leads the Cabinet and advises the President on appropriate appointments for the Ministers in the Cabinet. The President appoints the Cabinet Ministers, who are chosen from the sitting Members of Parliament. The current Cabinet includes Ministers of Defense, Finance, Manpower, Health, Education, Trade and Industry, and National Development.

The Judiciary

The Judiciary hears civil and criminal cases brought before it by individuals, businesses or government bodies and, through those cases, interprets the law. The Judiciary has a two-tier court system with State Courts and Supreme Courts. The State Courts are trial courts while the Supreme Courts are courts of appeal, although they can also try certain serious cases. The Court of Appeal is the highest court in Singapore and has the last word on interpreting the law. The Chief Justice heads the Court of Appeal.

The Judiciary functions independently from the other branches of government, although the President appoints The Chief Justice, Judges of Appeal, Judicial Commissioners and High Court Judges from candidates nominated by the Prime Minister.

Singapore uses the common law legal system, where decisions rendered by a court becomes binding precedent for courts of equal or lower status. Please see our article on Singapore's Legal System if you are interested in learning more about the Judiciary.

C. Democratic Structure of Singapore

All domestic newspapers, radio stations, and television channels are owned by companies linked to the government. Editorials and news coverage generally support state policies, and self-censorship is common, though newspapers occasionally publish critical content. The government uses racial or religious tensions and the threat of terrorism to justify restrictions on freedom of speech. Media outlets, bloggers, and public figures have been subjected to harsh civil and criminal penalties for speech deemed to be seditious, defamatory, or injurious to religious sensitivities. Major online news sites must obtain licenses and respond to regulators' requests to remove prohibited content. However, foreign media and a growing array of online domestic outlets including news sites and blogs are widely consumed and offer alternative views, frequently publishing articles that are critical of the government or supportive of independent activism.

D. The Council and city managers of Singapore

In Singapore, a Town Council (TC) are entities formed by at least one elected Member of Parliament (MP) and residents and are responsible for the day-to-day operations in managing the common property of Housing and Development Board (HDB) residential flats and commercial property within the town. Town Councils' sizes and structure can be changed via political electoral changes. It is considered a very limited form of local government that are strictly limited to estate management, and where its members have no separation of powers from the national government. As of November 2020, there are 17 town councils operating in Singapore.

E. Finance of Singapore

Since gaining independence from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has been managing its own budget. Its central government has remained relatively small with respect to those of most industrialized countries, with total public expenditures about 14.32% of GDP in 2019. The size of the public sector, however, is bigger, particularly when we count the Central Provident Fund, a comprehensive social security system that includes pension schemes, sickness benefits, family protection and other welfare programmes. On top of this, an important role in Singapore's economy is played by state-owned enterprises.

The budget is divided into four main sections: social development, security and external relations, economic development and government administration. The areas that attract most public spending include defence (SGD 14,762), education (SGD 13,090), transport (SGD 11,748) and health (SGD 10,632). The expenditures incurred for the prime minister's office are relatively small, as they account for about 1.1% of the budget.

F. Control of Local Government in Singapore

There is no local government and no local elections in Singapore. The community development councils, headed by a mayor, administer certain community and social services delegated by government ministries. Whereas the Federal Government and State governments share power in countless ways, a local government must be granted power by the State. In general, mayors, city councils, and other governing bodies are directly elected by the people.

Local Government System of Administration In Japan

JAPAN.

Capital and largest city	Tokyo 35°41′N 139°46′E
Official languages	Japanese (de facto)
Demonym(s)	Japanese
Government	Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Emperor	Naruhito
Prime Minister	Fumio Kishida
Legislature	National Diet
Upper house	House of Councillors
Lower house	House of Representatives
Formation	
Meiji Constitution	November 29, 1890
Current constitution	May 3, 1947
Area	
Total	377,975 km^2 (145,937 sq mi) (62nd)
Water (%)	1.4
Population	
March 1, 2024 estimate	▼ 123,970,000 (11th)
2020 census	▼ 126,226,568
Density	330/km^2 (854.7/sq mi) (44th)
GDP (PPP)	2024 estimate
Total	▲ $6.721 trillion (4th)
Per capita	▲ $54,184 (34th)

GDP (nominal)	2024 estimate
Total	▼ $4.110 trillion (4th)
Per capita	▼ $33,138] (30th)
Gini (2018)	▲ 33.4 medium
HDI (2022)	▼ 0.920 very high (24th)
Currency	Japanese yen (¥)
Time zone	UTC+09:00 (JST)
Driving side	Left
Calling code	+81
ISO 3166 code	JP

Government type

Constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government

Independence

660 BC (traditional founding by Emperor JIMMU)

Constitution

3 May 1947

Legal system

Modeled after European civil law system with English-American influence; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations

In 1603, a Tokugawa shogunate ushered in a long period of isolation from foreign influence. For 250 years this policy enabled Japan to enjoy stability and a flowering of its indigenous culture. Following the Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States in 1854, Japan opened its ports and began to intensively modernize and industrialize. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japan became a regional power. After World War II, Japan recovered to become an economic power with the Japan's economy continued to boom. This led to Japan rapidly catching up with the West in foreign trade, gross national product and general quality of life. However, the 1973

oil crisis shocked the Japanese economy as it is heavily depended on imported oil. The economy experienced a major slowdown starting in the 1990s following three decades of unprecedented growth. However, Japan is a major economic power, both in Asia and globally.

Local Government Civil Service

The National Personnel Authority (NPA) is the central personnel agency of the Japanese government. The NPA is governed by three commissioners. Commissioners are appointed by the Cabinet, with the consent of the Diet, for a four year term of office. One of these Commissioners is designated as President, the equivalent in rank to a Minister. The secretariat of the NPA is headed by the Secretary-General, the equivalent in rank to an Administrative Vice-Minister. The secretariat consists of four bureaus, National Public Service Ethics Board, the National Institute of Public Administration and regional offices, Local office.

The main functions of the NPA are to: (i) define rules concerning appointment, promotion and retirement; (ii) conduct recruitment examinations; (iii) recommend revisions in salary and plan alternative remuneration systems; (iv) coordinate and conduct training programs; (v) take charge of working conditions and welfare; (vi) monitor discipline and ethics; and (vii) review adverse action taken by ministries and agencies.

Legal basis

The National Personnel Authority (NPA) was established in December 1948 under the "National Public Service Law (NPSL)". Although under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet, the NPA operates as an independent authority. It seeks to maintain neutrality in government employees and to protect employees' welfare and interests in compensation for certain restrictions on their labour rights.

Recruitment

Most initial appointments to the public service are made in junior level positions through competitive recruitment examinations held by the NPA. Mid career recruitment is uncommon. Requirements to sit for these examinations are Japanese nationality and age (minimum and maximum age limit is fixed). No academic qualifications are required. Examinations are usually comprised of general knowledge tests, specialist knowledge tests and interviews. In regard to specialist knowledge tests, examinations are divided into separate sub-divisions such as law, economics, physics, etc. which each candidate may choose according to their specialization. Those who pass the written examination are automatically called for interview. Enlistment, however, does not guarantee recruitment to the public service. Each ministry and agency select candidates from this list to interview, and have the final choice over whom they recruit.

Promotion and Rotation

Promotion & rotation of personnel are decided unilaterally by the management. The management are not obliged to circulate announcements of a vacancy, nor do they have to wait for employee applications. In general practice, employees are rotated to different positions every few years. The positions they are transferred to are not necessarily posts within their own organizations but sometimes those in other ministries and agencies. Personnel rotated to other organizations usually return to their initial appointment ministries or agencies, at a later stage. Promotion is decided on a merit basis. No examination is conducted regarding promotion. The initial levels of recruitment examination, seniority and performance record of an employee are major factors in deciding promotion.

Remuneration

The remuneration of government employees is comprised of two elements, salary (basic pay) and allowances. There are 17 salary schedules depending on type of service. Each salary schedule, except for that for the Designated Service, has grades & pay steps according to the level of complexity, difficulty and responsibility of duties. When an employee performs satisfactorily for 12 months he/she may be given a pay step increase. Allowances are paid when employees meet the conditions for entitlement. Certain allowances are paid to remunerate excessive responsibility or difficulty of duty while others are to cover living expenditures. Remuneration is paid monthly and tax, pension, health insurance premiums and so forth, are deducted in advance.

Training

Staff training is conducted by each ministry and agency. There are two basic types of training; general training conducted for each level of employee, and professional training to provide specific skills and techniques. The NPA is responsible for the overall planning and coordination of training programs conducted by the ministries and agencies and its own inter-ministerial training courses which aim at giving an opportunity for participants to reconsider their responsibilities from a broader perspective, reinforce their sense of identity as public servants to the entire community and cultivate a sense of unity among government employees.

Retirement Allowances and Pension

National government employees receive a lump sum of non-contributory allowance at the time of their retirement. The amount of retirement allowance is (final monthly salary) x (retirement allowance index). The index takes into consideration the number of years of service and the reason for retirement. The pension scheme for government employees is operated by the National Public Employee Mutual Aid Association, participation in which is compulsory for all employees. The pension fund is furnished by contributions from employees and the government. The mutual aid pension is, in principle, granted to those who retire after 25 years or more of service and pension payment starts from the age of 60.

Japan has a well-established local government system dating back centuries. During the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century, Japan underwent modernization reforms that included the establishment of a local government system inspired by Western models. Today, Japan has a three-tier system consisting of prefectures, municipalities, and wards. Prefectures are the highest level of local government responsible for broader regional issues, while municipalities and wards focus on local administrative matters.

Japanese local government has its basis in the Constitution of Japan, which recognizes local government as essential to democracy and which establishes it as part of the state's system of governance. The core legislation relating to local government can be found in the Local Autonomy Law, which divides local public entities into two major categories.

The first category consists of municipalities (or "shi", "cho", or son) which are further broken down into cities, towns, and villages. The second category consists of prefectures (or Ken). Under this two-tier system, all districts of the country belong to one of the 3,229 municipalities and at the same time fall within the boundaries of one of the 47 prefectures. In addition, within the prefectures and municipalities, there exist many special local authorities, comparable to special districts in the United States and special purpose bodies in Canada.

A comparison of local government in Japan and in the United States and Canada reveals two important features of the Japanese system. First, despite decentralization efforts in recent years, government in Japan is still highly centralized compared to the U.S. This is evidenced by both the absence of municipal courts as well as by the adherence of the prefectures to the national constitution, rather than to their own individual constitutions, as is the case in the United States. While Canada also has only one constitution, which applies to both the federal government and the provinces, the system is distinguished by the large degree of control granted to the provinces over such key areas as health care and education.

A second key feature of local government in Japan is the high degree of uniformity, with administration based exclusively on the strong mayor system. The Local Autonomy Law grants local authorities basically identical organizational forms and functions, with the exception of Tokyo's central districts and the 12 large metropolitan cities, despite the differences which exist between the authorities in terms of area and population. This emphasis on uniformity and central guidance is rooted in the belief that the quality and level of services should be on the same plane

throughout the country. To achieve this goal, authorities are committed to the principle of applying nationally devised solutions and plans to all problems and situations, rather than establishing ad hoc organizations to deal with circumstances as they arise. The central government retains primary responsibility for the formulation of policies guiding local government administration in such areas as finance, social welfare, education, and planning. All of this is made possible by the Japanese local government structure and in particular by the Ministry of Public Managements, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunication, the national agency responsible for matters concerning local government.

Key functions of the local government systems in Japan

1. Prefectures (47 in total):

   - Responsible for regional administration and public services.

   - Oversee areas such as education, healthcare, transportation, and public safety.

   - Led by a governor and a prefectural assembly.

2. Municipalities (over 1,700):

   - Consist of cities, towns, and villages.

   - Responsible for local community affairs and basic public services.

   - Led by a mayor and a local municipal assembly.

Key Functions:

   - Provide public services (e.g., utilities, social welfare, garbage collection).

   - Implement national and prefectural policies at the local level.

   - Manage local infrastructure and urban planning.

   - Promote local economic development and tourism.

Local Government System of Administration in China:

CHINA

Capital	Beijing 39°55′N 116°23′E
Largest city by city proper	Chongqing
Largest city by urban population	Shanghai
Official languages Official script	Standard Chinese (de facto) Simplified characters
Ethnic groups (2020)	91.1% Han Chinese 8.9% others
Religion (2023)	33.4% Buddhism 25.2% no religion 19.6% Taoism 17.7% other folk beliefs 2.5% Christianity 1.6% Islam
Demonym(s)	Chinese
Government	Unitary Marxist–Leninist one-party socialist republic
CCP General Secretary	Xi Jinping
Premier	Li Qiang
Congress Chairman	Zhao Leji
CPPCC Chairman	Wang Huning
Vice President	Han Zheng
Legislature	National People's Congress
Formation	
First pre-imperial dynasty	c. 2070 BCE
First imperial dynasty	221 BCE
Establishment of the	1 January 1912

Republic of China	
Admitted to the United Nations	24 October 1945
Proclamation of the People's Republic	1 October 1949
First constitution	20 September 1954
Current constitution	4 December 1982
Most recent polity admitted	20 December 1999

Area	
Total	9,596,961 km^2 (3,705,407 sq mi) (3rd / 4th)
Water (%)	2.8

Population	
2023 estimate	▼ 1,409,670,000$^]$ (2nd)
Density	145/km^2 (375.5/sq mi) (83rd)

GDP (PPP)	2024 estimate
Total	▲ $35.291 trillion (1st)
Per capita	▲ $25,015 (73rd)

GDP (nominal)	2024 estimate
Total	▲ $18.533 trillion (2nd)
Per capita	▲ $13,136[10] (68th)

Gini (2020)	▼ 37.1 medium
HDI (2022)	▲ 0.788 high (75th)
Currency	Renminbi (元/¥) (CNY)
Time zone	UTC+8 (CST)
Date format	YMD
Driving side	right (mainland) left (Hong Kong, Macau)
Calling code	+86 (mainland) +852 (Hong Kong) +853 (Macau)
ISO 3166 code	CN

China, officially the People's Republic of China (PRC), is a country in East Asia. With a population exceeding 1.4 billion, it is the world's second-most populous country after India. China spans the equivalent of five time zones and borders fourteen countries by land. With an area of nearly 9.6 million square kilometers (3,700,000 sq mi), it is the third-largest country by total land area. The country is divided into 33 province-level divisions: 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities, and two semi-autonomous special administrative regions. **Beijing** is the national capital, while Shanghai is its most populous city by urban area and largest financial center along with Chongqing as the largest city proper in the world.

China's local government system has experienced significant changes throughout its history. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the country initially embraced a highly centralized system. However, economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s led to the introduction of greater decentralization and local autonomy. Currently, China comprises provinces, cities, counties, townships, and villages. Provincial governments have significant power, while cities and counties administer local affairs. Townships and villages handle grassroots-level governance.

The administrative divisions of China have consisted of several levels since ancient times, due to China's large population

and geographical area. The constitution of China provides for three levels of government. However in practice, there are five levels of local government; the provincial (province, autonomous region, municipality, and special administrative region), prefecture, county, township, and village.

Since the 17th century, provincial boundaries in China have remained largely static. Major changes since then have been the reorganization of provinces in the northeast after the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the formation of autonomous regions, based on Soviet ethnic policies. The provinces serve an important cultural role in China, as people tend to identify with their native province.

Functions of Local Government in China:

Provinces (34 in total):

➢ Largest administrative divisions, responsible for regional affairs.
➢ Led by a provincial government and a provincial people's congress.

Prefectures, Counties, and Townships:

➢ Smaller administrative divisions within the provinces.
➢ Responsible for local public services and implementation of policies.

Key Functions:

➢ Implement national and provincial policies and directives.
➢ Manage local public services, infrastructure, and social welfare.
➢ Oversee local economic development, land use, and environmental protection.
➢ Maintain public order and security at the local level.
➢ Coordinate with higher-level governments and the party system.

Local Government Administrative System in Pakistan

Pakistan is a country of 155 million people, estimated in 2006 (Government of Pakistan, 2006) and has a GNP per capita of US $ 510. It was created in 1947 as a result of partition of united India by the British. As of today, review of the development scene and service delivery arrangements at the ground level point out that the quality and quantum of development are far from satisfactory, in substance or speed. For women, social indicators are far worse and depressing. Nearly one-third of people live on less than $1 per day, and poverty has been increasing throughout the 1990s (Asian Development Bank, 2003). Although there is a remarkable portfolio of programs and initiatives that have been put into place over the past few decades, none of them have been able to create a development process—that is, to engage the local community and resources in a way that would allow them to proceed with less state development intervention in accordance with global trends. Pakistan's history over the past 20 years is one of delayed political and economic reform. Intermittent military rule has tainted political history (Leftwhich, 1993). Since independence in 1947, there have been four martial laws under different dispensations and three constitutions have been enacted (1956, 1962 and 1973).

Since the British East India Company established the first municipal corporation in Madras in 1688, local governments have existed on the Indian subcontinent for many centuries. The Board

of Conservancy was founded in Karachi in 1846. The condition of LG during political interregnum is mirrored in the fact that every military dictatorship since Pakistan's formation in 1947 has supported and implemented its own form of grassroots democracy. The current regime is no exception. LGs did quite well under the military overlords compared to their previous performance. The fact that many of the people who have been elected to the national and provincial assemblies started their political careers in local politics is equally noteworthy. The reasons why Pakistani social institutions are resistant to decentralization are explained by Shah, Anwar (1997:10). He claims that decentralization has always been hampered by political unpredictability and feudal interest. In the intervening ages, centralized regimes were preferred by military monarchs and feudal power. By directing development funds through members of parliament and occasionally by outright dissolving local government institutions, the central government undermined local government.

The New System of Local Government Like any other developing nation, Pakistan has experienced worsening issues due to the federal and provincial governments' excessive power concentration in the areas of infrastructure development and public services. Second, all significant facets of public service delivery were under bureaucratic control with no input from local elected officials or members of the public, and there was minimal coordination between various district-level offices. Few and comparatively insignificant facets of the provision of public services were within the authority of elected entities. Due to the nature of the system, the provincial and central government did the policy making and district authorities acted as the implementation staff with little say in decision making. The crisis of confidence in government led to alienation and low levels of citizens' participation, creating a vicious cycle of even more top-down and less responsive government. These facts, along with a lack of resources and a weak administrative competence, had severely limited the ability to provide services. Building the institutions for a competent public sector is crucial to increasing state efficacy, but it is also quite challenging. It can be quite challenging to remove subpar systems after they are established. Even if the status quo is unjust or ineffective, strong interests arise in preserving it (The World Bank, 1997:79). Under the auspices of the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), the Pakistani government initiated the "Devolution of Power and Authority" program in response to the widespread prevalence of these traditional symptoms in the nation. The Chief Executive's Secretariat developed this specialized division. After a rigorous process of consultation and deliberations that lasted only around twenty months, the NRB introduced the new local government structure. Thus, on August 14, 2001, Pakistan's 54th birthday, the new system went into force.

Pakistan has been implementing a drastic program of local government reforms for the last six years. Prior to being enacted in the 2001 Local Government Ordinances (LGO 2001), it was first described in the 2000 Devolution Plan. The reforms have to do with giving the lower levels of local government more authority. Particularly at the local level, Pakistan's system of government underwent a radical change as a result of the devolution plan and local government legislation. Districts, tehsils, and unions are the three levels of local government that make up the three-tiered local government framework. The subsidiary principle, which involves the transfer of authority from provinces to districts and various lower levels, is the foundation of the new system. There are three

levels of government: district, town, or taluka/tehsil (the middle tier), and union (the lowest rung). There are city district governments in every provincial capital. With the help of district officials, each district is now led by an elected Nazim (mayor). This is one of the most significant shifts in Pakistani government since the country's independence in 1947, even though there are still a lot of intricacies to iron out.

A key aim of the programme is to improve delivery of public service to citizens and improve current unacceptable performance on key social and poverty indicators. The local government reform represents a bold attempt to empower the citizens of Pakistan and transform an over centralized and ineffective service delivery system into a decentralized, responsive and accountable one. The majority of district nazims are from well-known political or commercial families, but a third of the council members are women, and many of them are new to politics—statistics that point to societal transformation! Bari (2001). Agriculture, health, education, community development, information technology, finance, planning, and revenue were transferred from the provinces to the district government under the new system. They are now financially competent with regard to funds transferred from the provinces and local taxes (National Reconstruction Bureau, 2001). In addition to being financially capable of paying their fair share of property taxes, general sales tax (GST), and local taxes, town/taluka governments have assumed some of the responsibilities previously held by municipal authorities, such as those pertaining to garbage disposal, roads, water, and sanitation. The union councils are primarily responsible for overseeing and monitoring the provision of services and carrying out minor improvement initiatives. Union councils receive a portion of local taxes and cash directly from the district. The following is a point-by-point citation of features that were first introduced in Pakistani history.

Citizens Community Boards (CCB)

Recognizing the importance of local involvement in development initiatives, the new local government structure calls for the creation of CCBs to guarantee community involvement. These are local people's voluntary, non-profit organizations that encourage participation in both development and non-development activities. In order to monitor service performance, ensure that planning and development are carried out in accordance with local needs, and foster accountability and openness, community participation in local government is crucial. These Boards carry out tasks like identifying municipal and development needs and mobilizing resources; creating, maintaining, and managing public facilities; providing assistance to the poor, widows, and families living in extreme poverty; and establishing stakeholder associations such as those between patients and hospitals and parents and teachers. While CCBs must raise 20% of the cash for a project on their own, 25% of local government monies are set aside for them (DSP, 2003).

Local Government Finance

Provincial Finance Awards are intended to provide districts with formula-based fiscal transfers under the new local government structure. According to the recommendations of the Provincial Finance Commission, which was set up for this purpose and is based on the concepts of fiscal need, fiscal capability, fiscal effort, and fiscal success, each District receives a development grant (Charlton et al., 2002). The commission is led by the provincial government's minister of finance, and its members include the secretaries of local government, finance, and planning and development. Its members also include three professionals from the private sector, one Tehsil Nazim, one Union Nazim, and one District Nazim. Local governments have the authority to impose local taxes from a list provided in LGO (2001) in addition to the funding from the provincial government. Local governments still rely heavily on transfers from the provincial government, which makes them reliant on the provinces even if they are permitted to impose taxes on some services. On the eve of the LGO's (2001) promulgation, a baseline assessment was conducted. It found that district governments had a funding rate of over 95%, while TMAs in different provinces had financing rates ranging from 50% to over 90%. But the formula based awards under PFC seem to balance the effects of this dependence to make the districts operate independently of the provinces.

Impact of New Local Government System on Service Delivery

Local government reforms were intended to bring about core structural changes in the administrative machinery of the government. They included separation of powers, relocation of functions, bringing the state closer to citizens, and bridging the gap between central government and local population. Devolution in Pakistan is meant to bring justice to the doorstep and improve the performance of the local administrations, courts, and police. It was aimed that basic human rights would be better recognized and protected under devolution (Cyan and Porter 2004). The most imperative reason presented by the government for the implementation of these reforms was to devolve the decision making powers to the grass root levels of civil society. However, positive impacts of these reforms on the public service delivery may take some time to substantiate.

The new task lines, jurisdictional boundaries, and delegations of functional and authoritative tasks to the lower levels of government were introduced by Cheema et al. (2005). Even after other activities in these departments were devolved, the province still oversees foreign-funded projects, manages teaching hospitals, conducts agricultural research and development, and regulates medical standards. At the provincial level, some financial heads of expenditure—such as the pay and allowance costs for all department employees—have been successfully maintained.

Primary health care and management of district and Tehsil hospitals, assessment and collection of land taxes, agricultural income tax, agricultural extension and farm water management, planning and design of district roads and buildings are now devolved to the district governments from the province. District governments are now in charge of services including building new schools, upgrading existing ones, and maintaining and inspecting schools that were formerly under the province's jurisdiction. The tehsil level now receives services from the province local government department, housing department, urban development department, and public health engineering department (PHED). Important municipal services like street lighting, drainage systems, sanitation, water supply, and sewerage have also been decentralized.

Since 2001, the new local government structure has been in operation. To ascertain the trends in areas such as health, education, water and sanitation, and law enforcement and justice, statistical data from multiple sources is studied. A more

comprehensive perspective on public services analysis would be provided by this chapter. Williamson et al. (2005) investigated improvements in post-devolution social service delivery by visiting elementary schools, BHUs (Basic Health Units), and water supply schemes. Their findings were based on field trips to three areas in Pakistan. This study is specifically mentioned in this chapter. The results of this study on important areas of public services are listed below.

1. Health The district level now controls a substantial portion of the health sector's administration, which was previously overseen by the provincial health department. In every district, the post of Executive District Officer Health (EDO-H) has been established and filled. This office now oversees all medical facilities, including hospitals at district headquarters, with the exception of teaching hospitals. Although they now have autonomy, the teaching hospitals are still governed by the province. EDO Health is indirectly answerable to the public since they report to the District Coordination Officer (DCO), who in turn reports to the District Nazim (Mayor).

2. Learning Education has mainly been transferred to the district and tehsil (sub-district) levels under the new local government structure. Primary, secondary, and postsecondary education are currently under the districts' jurisdiction. At the district level, the Executive District Officer (EDO) is in charge of education, with assistance from the District Officer (DDO) and Assistant District Officer (ADO). The overall number of senior education employees has decreased as a result of devolution. In the past, there were four District Education Officers with equal authority and power to oversee schools: two for primary schools for boys and girls and two for secondary schools for both. Now there are only three: the EDO-E and DO (male) and DO (female). The district government can recruit school teachers upto BPS-16 (Basic Pay Scale) and below but the authority over staffing-hiring, firing, and transfers for BPS-17 and above remains with the provincial government. Thus, even though district governments have the legal and institutional authority to provide educational services, their ability to effectively manage service provision in the sector is constrained by the provinces' administrative control over district staff (Nayyar-Stone et al, 2006).

3. Sanitation and Water Since the new local government system was implemented, access to water and sanitation services has improved; nonetheless, it is impossible to determine the extent to which decentralization has improved these services. In 2004, more than 70% of Pakistani households had access to the government water supply, up to 46% in 2002 (Cockcroft et al, 2004-05). The situation is worse in rural regions than in urban ones, where 46% of people still lack access to a supply of drinkable water (Williamson et al, 2005). In contrast to the health and education sectors, not only has access to water and sanitation services improved, but so has customer satisfaction. In 2004, more over 30% of respondents said they were satisfied with the water and sanitation services, compared to 27% in 2002 (Cockcroft et al, 2004-05). Development initiatives including the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP), School Sanitation Program (SSP), and Water Quality Assessment (WQS) program, which were supported and financed by ADB, DFID, and UNICEF, have played a significant role in increasing customer satisfaction with services in this sector. To help local institutions become more capable of managing these programs independently, ADB and DFID are also collaborating with the Government of Pakistan on

the development of institutional capacity in the districts (Ahmed, 2006).

4. Police and Justice Eliminating the deputy commissioner position and transferring authority to the district and session judge, district Nazim, DCO, and district police officer (DPO) positions was one significant change made to the new local government structure. By depriving the government of special and discretionary authorities, this is said to help the court become more independent.

Police accountability has been redesigned under the new decentralized system with the establishment of new District Public Safety Commissions, Police Complaints Authorities, and judicial bodies. However, some critics of the new system think that under the new system police have been given even more powers than they previously had and more opportunities to escape accountability (ADB/DFID/WB, 2004). The District Police Officer (DPO) is not responsible to any executive head in the district. And District Nazim has only some limited oversight functions over the police. The powers of the Nazim to write annual confidential report (ACR) of the police have not been used in any district. Either the Nazims do not know of these powers or even if they know, these are largely ineffective as the reports are to be countersigned by the provincial police officer and Chief Minister.

5. Poverty Reduction Decentralized government is thought to be able to facilitate local development, guarantee more effective distribution of resources (including development aid), boost local resource mobilization, and improve local governance, even though there is no proof that decentralization and poverty reduction are directly related. Consequently, this could open the door to more successful methods of reducing poverty (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000). The decrease of poverty is positively impacted by decentralization. According to Asante (2003:2), decentralization's benefits—such as democracy, public engagement, responsiveness, accountability, and equity—have given rise to the notion that it will increase responsiveness to the impoverished.

Decentralization of local government administrative system in south Korea.

Because it was anticipated that decentralization would enable changes in politics, the economy, and society by shifting power and resources from the center to lower levels of government, it has consistently attracted scholarly and practical attention. Decentralization is frequently described in literature as a multifaceted process that encompasses administrative, budgetary, and political decentralization (Falleti 2010, 8). Political decentralization, which typically involves the public election of local representatives (local executives and legislators), is the implementation of a new constitutional or legislative framework for subnational political players. Conversely, fiscal decentralization transfers taxation power and fiscal resources to subnational governments, increasing their fiscal capability and autonomy. Finally, administrative decentralisation means the general transfer of public service and administrative functions such as social services, education, development, and welfare to subnational government. Other scholarly works also include devolution, de-concentration, or privatisation under certain circumstances as different types of decentralisation that possibly disperse the concentration of power and resources (Turner 1999).

Over the past two decades, perspectives on decentralisation and the central-local relationship in South Korea have gradually shifted from political to economic, reflecting the aspects of decentralisation as mentioned in the previous paragraph (Bae 2016, 71). The initial call for decentralisation during the earlier democratisation period predominantly focused on the promotion of democracy by weakening the strong state institutions that possessed enormous policymaking authority and capacity to shape the politics and the economy without much consideration for localities and civil society (J.-S. Lee 1996; Yoo 1994). However, since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, there has been a back-and-forth in central-local relations over neoliberalism. The centralised state was undoubtedly threatened politically and economically by the structural economic issues and ineffective centralisation, which also contributed to the "developmental state's" sharp fall (Minns 2001; Pirie 2007). At the same time, the growing disparity between the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA) and non-SMA, as well as the growing number of decreasing cities due to domestic migration and aging populations, necessitate more systematic cooperation for balanced development between the locals and the center. This suggests that the conventional binary perspective of decentralization and local governments might not fully represent subnational democracy.

Democratisation and Decentralisation: Toward Local Democracy

A national democratic movement for democratization ultimately resulted in the new democratic Constitution of 1987, which contained the foundations of several democratic mechanisms and institutions, following the fall of the authoritarian regime (1961–1987) that suspended the implementation of local democracy under the pretext of national reunification, administrative efficiency for economic growth, national security, and financial scarcity of local governments. This includes the establishment of a constitutional court (Article 111), local governments (Article 117-8), fundamental human rights (Article 10-37), and the popular election of the president (Article 67). Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung, the presidential contenders in the 1987 election, promised to change the Local Autonomy Act to establish a system of local government through direct elections and usher in a period of local autonomy (J.-S. Lee 1996). Even while decentralization during the earlier democratization phase was a big step toward local democracy, the strong centralism of the past made it hard for pro-decentralists to strive for full-fledged local democracy since it established a route dependency. Politicians and central bureaucrats of the older generation were opposed to locals sharing power. During this time, national democratic movements blossomed, but local forces and civil society were, at most, minimally mobilized to affect the decentralization process (Bae and Kim 2013; S. Kim 2006).

It was not until the mid-1990s that there was somewhat substantial progress toward decentralised governance by allowing direct election of local councilmen and executive heads of local government through the newly revised Local Autonomy Act (1994). Since then, local governments have enacted their own bylaws and ordinances regarding local affairs within the scope of legal and constitutional boundaries (Article 22-23). The various administrative and financial as well as the functional capacities of local governments have also been gradually strengthened to deal with growing demands from residents.

A major turning point was the 1997 economic crisis, which led South Korea to seek further decentralization from an economic standpoint. To address economic inefficiency and the "globalization" of economic issues, civilian government officials proposed structural change and reorganization. Former President Kim Young-sam's "globalization" (segyehwa) approach forced central bureaucrats to reorganize ineffective central ministries, despite the fact that his reform package was only partially successful (Kihl 2005, 152-4). Several reform committees were established to carry out the downsizing of the core ministries under the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003), which popularized government reorganization schemes (P.-S. Kim 1999). The Law for the Promotion of Transfer of Central Authorities was also passed by the Kim Dae-jung administration as part of the government reorganization process. It established the Presidential Committee on Devolution Promotion in 1999 to accelerate the transfer of central functions to subnational governments and government innovation.

From the middle of the 1990s until the Kim Dae-jung administration, a number of decentralization changes were put into place and generally received positive reviews. However, they also left a lot of things incomplete at the same time. According to academics like Choi and Wright (2004), decentralization during this time at least made space for municipal politics and citizen involvement in local issues. Local governments that had little financial and decision-making power also started to try to satisfy the expectations of their constituents. However, despite being referred to as "Mr. Local Autonomy" and receiving a lot of support during the IMF crisis recovery, President Kim Dae-jung's administration's decentralization reform was generally mediocre. The government transferred administrative affairs without proper fiscal resources and often faced strong bureaucratic resistance internally from the central ministries. Instead, his reform drive based on neoliberalism required a faster top-down decision from the central ministries to effectively recover the national economy (Bae 2018, 208).

Consolidation of Local Democracy in the 2000s: Change and Continuity

The scale of decentralisation reform under the Kim Dae-jung administration was not as great as expected by the people, but the Roh Moo-hyun administration was inaugurated with better conditions. Whereas the previous administrations considered decentralisation as part of broader reform agendas, the Roh administration brought it to the fore as a top national priority (Bae 2016; Koo and Kim 2018). President Roh was elected as the sixteenth president of South Korea in December 2002 and showed strong intent to carry out decentralisation, de-concentration, and balanced development policies during his term in office. His administration claimed that the ailing South Korean politics and economy originated from inefficient distribution of resources between the centre and the periphery and suggested five directions for major reform—so-called roadmaps—such as administrative reform, public personnel reform, e-government, financial and tax reform, and decentralisation (Park 2007).

In order to realign the structure of central-local interactions within a specified timeframe, the Roh government implemented decentralization reform with specific objectives outlined in "the decentralization roadmap." For instance, it was necessary for the central ministries to first outsource their activities to the

subnational governments in order to build trust with local governments and inhabitants. Only then could they address unforeseen issues. This idea was proposed since the central government's lack of faith in local governments' abilities was one of the reasons decentralization took so long. Since the central government had too many functions dealing with purely local affairs, such as local government organizations, urban planning functions, and resident welfare, the decentralization idea was founded on the idea that various government affairs should belong to the subnational governments where residents reside (subsidiary guideline). Finally, because the issue with the previous decentralization reform was that the government assigned functions without assigning adequate financial and personnel resources, the central government was obliged to delegate both functions and authority (complete guideline) (S.-J. Lee 2005, 356).

Whereas the previous decentralisation reforms faced severe resistance from the 'pro-centre' political figures, including central bureaucrats and national politicians, decentralisation programs in this period (2003–2007) were carried out under the leadership of strong 'pro-local' president and reformists in the government. Many of the policy proposals made by his team about the settlement of decades-long imbalances between the center and the periphery were included in national agendas after President Roh took office in February 2003. Specifically, "decentralization" (jibangbungwon) and "balanced development" (gyunhyeongbaljeon) emerged as two of his government's top priorities. Although there was undoubtedly organized opposition to this policy direction during various stages of decentralization, President Roh succeeded in lowering opposition and fostering support from the bureaucrats to some degree by appointing his key policy advisors as leaders of reform institutions, such as the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization (PCGID), the Chief Policy Advisor to the President, and the Ministry of Government and Home Affairs (Bae, 2016).

The Roh government was able to enact the Special Act on Decentralization (2004) as a result, which includes a sensible division of powers between the federal and local governments, the transfer of financial resources to the lower tiers of government, the bolstering of local capacities and responsibilities, the reviving of civil society, and more. The PCGID and other relevant central ministries created new institutions that complied with the roadmap's standards and implemented the reform agendas mentioned in it. Following these reform initiatives, among other things, the resident recall system (2007), group litigation (2006), Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (2006), and resident petitioning (2004) were implemented (Bae, 2016, 67). To improve the budgetary capability of subnational governments, the local allocation tax rate was raised from 15 to 19.24 percent in 2006. Although the promotion of decentralisation reform lost strength after the failed attempt to impeach President Roh in 2004 and faced bureaucratic resistance, decentralisation measures under the Roh administration were notable achievements.

Comparatively speaking, the RAI data indicate the relative position of local and regional power in South Korea. South Korea has made some strides toward giving subnational governments more authority and responsibility for implementing policies, as seen in Figure 32.2. However, the central approval and local borrowing and taxation authorities linked to national policies are what provide local governments their institutional authority (e.g.,

staff, organization). Because of this restricted decentralization, South Korea's (blue) local government self-rule component received a relatively low score, on par with Japan's (Hooghe et al., 2010). Furthermore, as the "shared-rule" score (in orange) shows, South Korean local governments lack efficient routes for communicating policies to the national government and are underrepresented in the national policymaking process. The Local Autonomy Act guarantees the formation of local government associations to represent local governments' interests, but they have limited negotiation power over local borrowing or other financial burdens in national projects (Bae, 2018). Before the national government transfers some administrative responsibilities, the Moon administration gives local governments an opportunity to engage in "prior" discussions. However, when it comes to national policymaking, these local voices are frequently disregarded or structurally marginalized. Localities in South Korea are therefore less integrated with the central government, despite improvements in the construction of "democratic institutions" at the subnational level. This is due to a number of factors, including comparatively higher supralocal supervision, weak fiscal capacity, and an ineffective communication channel to the center, all of which frequently impede the further consolidation of local democracy and successful policy collaboration for citizens.

The aforementioned index's formal institutions of local democracy, however, are obviously limited in their ability to evaluate the general efficacy of local democracy; a more thorough examination of social forces is necessary. Sellers et al. (2020) affirmed the importance of democratic institutional arrangements and civil society within cities and towns, drawing inspiration from Michael Mann's (1984) idea of "infrastructural power," which emphasizes the state's efficacy through society. They maintained that a certain amount of democracy and the efficacy of policies in contemporary governments may be explained by both state-society and central-local ties at various governmental levels. In other words, a key factor in determining the actual advancement of local democracy is the degree to which communities and civil society participate in or are integrated with national government. According to this study, efficient local governance and democratic inclusion have depended heavily on "inclusive" democratic infrastructure at the local level that mediates connections between communities and state hierarchies (Sellers et al., 2020). Welfare programs, for instance, are determined by the national government and political party in Scandinavian welfare states. However, it would be impossible to implement welfare programs fairly and effectively without the involvement and influence of localities and civil society through a variety of participation channels, which were disregarded in the official institution-focused RAI rating.

Interestingly, a few empirical studies exploring local politics in newly established local democratic settings in South Korea have commonly perceived that a mayor-centred electoral coalition and local elites—including local developers, businesses, and media—dominate local politics without proper participation or consideration of civil society (Park 2000). Local politicians are devoted to building a clientelist connection to the national-level party organisations, because nomination for the next election depends on the central party leaders. Political parties are supposed to mediate the political world and the citizens, but the linkage role is limited in the South Korean context, as local citizens are more often occupied with national than local issues. Civic associations at the local level led by local elites played notable roles in some

policy areas, but overall, the slow growth of local citizen participation has been a recurring issue since the inception of local democracy (Bae and Kim 2013).

In conclusion, despite having effectively established democratic institutions at the national and local levels, South Korea lacks broader citizen participation, which is necessary for both state and local democracy to function effectively and for policy implementation to depend on sources other than the official state apparatus and institutions. Voter turnout for municipal elections has been significantly lower over the last 20 years than for presidential and National Assembly elections. Local referendums and resident recalls are two examples of participatory initiatives that have either not been utilized very often or have not been able to comply with legal criteria (Bae 2018, 267). More decentralization and more responsible democratic politics have been discouraged by the "dual" character of South Korean local democracy, which refers to institutions with no meaningful participation. Consolidating local democracy depends on increasing the participation of communities and civil society in national decision-making through broad political and policy integration. More systemic cooperation beyond mere decentralization is required since transboundary environmental issues, an aging population, decreasing cities, pandemics, and other concerns pose further vulnerabilities to local democracy, as will be covered in the next section.

Decentralisation of Local Administrative System in India:

Local Self-Government's decentralization and Development: Local governance in India encompasses both rural and urban regions (Sarma & Chakravarty, 2018). In rural areas, it is administered through panchayats, while in urban areas, the governance structure includes municipal corporations, municipal councils, and Nagar panchayats. The term "panchayat" has its roots in "panchasvanusthitah," signifying the traditional five-member Grama Sanghas or rural communities in Indian culture. This age-old institution has historically held authority over local civil and judicial matters within the community. The references to "Pancha" and "panchavanustitah" in Mahabharata's Shanti-Parva are closely connected to the concept of Panchayat (Singh, 1996). Kautilya, in 400 BC, detailed village councils in his 'Arthashastra', where the village government was overseen by the Adyaksha headman, responsible for collecting state dues and monitoring criminals. There are hints of the 'Ganapada' (village federation) in Valmiki's Ramayana, suggesting a federation of village republics (Ghosh & Pramanik, 1999). During the Vedic era (200 BC), self-government was the primary governance unit, featuring assemblies known as 'Sabha' and 'Samiti.' A Samiti was a Vedic Folk Assembly with the authority to elect a monarch in certain cases, while the Sabha handled judicial responsibilities (Singh, 1996). Over time, village bodies evolved into panchayats, responsible for overseeing village affairs and maintaining law and order. Additionally, caste panchayats existed, and in the south, village assemblies often had an executive body composed of representatives from various castes (Mathew, 1995). During the Mauryan era, the village served as the primary governance unit, but regular councils had not yet been established. However, in the Gupta era, village councils appeared to become regular entities, known as Panchamandalas in central India and Gramajanapadas in Bihar (Altekar, 2002).

During the Mughal era, villages were administered by their respective panchayats, a practice that gained prominence during Sher Shah's reign. Each panchayat was comprised of village elders tasked with ensuring the well-being of the community, administering justice, and imposing penalties on those who violated regulations. The village headman, acting as a semi-official representative, played a crucial role in bridging the gap between the panchayat and the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy. Akbar adopted and integrated this system into the civil government, whereby every community had its own self-sustaining panchayat responsible for local revenue, administrative oversight, judicial matters, and punishments (Ghosh & Pramanik, 1999). The Mughals instituted a comprehensive administrative system featuring a structured hierarchy of officials, particularly within the revenue department, a system that endured for centuries. Subsequently, the British assumed authority in India following the fall of the Mughal stronghold.

Before India's independence, the British introduced local-self-government as a representational institution, initially forming local organizations with nominated members around commerce centers. In 1687, the first municipal corporation was established in Madras, given the authority to levy taxes for constructing guild halls and schools (Mathew, 1995). Lord Mayo, during his tenure as Viceroy (1869-1872), introduced elected representatives in urban areas to decentralize authority for improved administrative efficiency (Mathew, 1995). The Bengal Chowkidar Act of 1870 allowed district magistrates to establish panchayats of nominated members in each village (Mathew, 1995). Lord Ripon's resolution in 1882 divided local boards into smaller units, increasing efficiency, and implementing an election mechanism. The government's decision in May 1882 marked a significant milestone, providing a substantial majority of elected non-official members on the local board, headed by a non-official chairman, often regarded as the Magna Carta of Indian municipal democracy (Mathew, 1995). Lord Ripon also introduced the concept of urban self-government and municipalities. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reform in 1919 transferred local authority to provinces, with eight provinces enacting local panchayat legislation by 1925, albeit with limited responsibilities (Stephen & Rajasekaran, 2001). The Government of India Act of 1935 marked progress in democratizing local self-government organizations (Government of India Act 1935, 1935).

India's local self-government was strengthened when the constitution was adopted on January 26, 1950. However, in the beginning, the Indian Constitution did not give constitutional provisions or status for local self-government. However, the various committees and their recommendations from time to time have exposed the significance of local self-government. Those numbers of committees were as follows: the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee in 1957, the Ashok Mehta Committee in 1977, the G.V.K. Rao Committee in 1986, the LM Sanghvi Committee in 1986, the Thungon Committee in 1988, and the Gadgil Committee in 1988. However, the recommendations and suggestions of all these committees on local self-government reached constitutional status when the P.V. Narasimha Rao Government passed the Panchayati Raj institutional bill passed as 73rd constitutional amendment Act 992, which came into force on April 24, 1993, and the Municipalities Bill, or 'Urban Local Government bill, passed as 74th constitutional amendment Act 1992, which came into force June 1, 1993. This constitutional amendment added a new chapter to the Indian constitution and made India a more federal and democratic nation. Hence, India's local governance has a rich

historical evolution, from ancient village councils to modern panchayats and urban local bodies, with significant reforms and constitutional amendments shaping its current structure and functions (Basu et al., 2015).

Decentralization and Local Self-Government: The Constitution of India conferred constitutional status upon local self-government by incorporating two fresh sections into the constitution: Part IX and Part IX-A. This part of the constitution was added by the 73rd and 74th constitution amendments in 1992, along with the details of various constitutional provisions about local self-government for rural areas as 'Panchayati Raj institutions and for urban areas as 'Municipalities.' Moreover, the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 and the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 added a new schedule: the 11th consisted of 29 functional items for panchayats and the 12th consisted of 18 functional items for municipalities in the constitution of India. The constitutional Articles 243 to 243-O deal with the provision of panchayats, and Articles 243-P to 243-ZG deal with the provision of municipalities (Basu et al., 2015).

Organizational Structure of the Local Self-Government System:

In India, the local selfgovernment system exhibits a clearly delineated organizational framework in both rural and urban regions.

(A) Rural Local Government: In rural regions, the local self-government system consists of three main governing bodies. At the top is the Zila Parishad or district council, which is responsible for overseeing multiple areas. Below the Zila Parishad are Panchayat Samitis or block councils, which constitute the Zila Parishad. Further down the hierarchy are Gram Panchayats or village councils. Each village in India has a Gram Sabha, comprising individuals above 18 years of age, who have the authority to directly elect Panchayat members. This structure, known as the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), is consistent across India, with tribal and reserved regions being exceptions. A Gram Panchayat must have a minimum population of 500 people, and its members are elected directly by the people for a five-year term. Zila Parishad serves as the apex body in rural local governance, with ex-officio and co-opted members. The ZP has a duration of three to five years and elects a chairman who supervises its executive office and reports to the Divisional Commissioner. The ZP operates through a network of standing committees (Jain & Polman, 2003; Narayana, 2005; Pal, 2002).

Panchayat Samiti is the intermediate layer, with members including ex-officio, associate, and co-opted members. The Pramukh, elected by the Samiti, holds authority over the Block.

Development Officer and has access to all Samiti records. The Block Development Officer manages development programs and is assisted by subject specialists. Gram Panchayat functions as the basic administrative body at the village level elected democratically. There is minimal permanent staff at this level, and most services are under the control of the Zila Parishad or Panchayat Samiti. A Gram Sevak (Secretary/Village level worker) is typically the only permanent staff member. The Village Level Worker (VLW) serves as a crucial link between Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samiti. **(B)Urban Local-Government**:

In urban areas, India has three types of local self-governing bodies:

i. Municipal Corporations (Nagar Nigam): Found in cities with a population of over a million, these corporations are headed by a Municipal Commissioner or Vice Chairman who is an IAS official appointed by the state government. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor, elected for one year by councilors, play political executive roles (Government of India, 2000; Mattewada Chandrakala, 2017).

ii. Municipal Councils (Nagar Palika): Smaller cities have Municipal Councils, consisting of elected, co-opted, and associate members. The chairman, chosen from the members, serves a five-year term and holds significant administrative authority. An Executive Officer, appointed by the state government, oversees general administrative tasks.

iii. Nagar Panchayats: These are transitional settlements from rural to urban areas (Bhagat, 2005). The chairman leads the Nagar Panchayat, while the Executive Officer is in charge of official responsibilities (Shaw, 2005). Ward members are elected through adult suffrage.

Significance of decentralisation of Local self-government in Indian politics:

The structural framework of Local Self-government within the Indian democratic system has played a pivotal role in preserving the federal structure and interconnecting the administrative system from the grassroots level to the central level (Figure No-1). These local self-governing bodies offer avenues for citizens residing in smaller state administrative units, such as villages, towns, and districts, to stay informed about all policies and programs. People actively engage in the democratic system, both directly and indirectly, at this level. Local government primarily operates at the village and district levels, making it the government that is closest to the general populace (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). It is intricately involved in addressing the day-to-day lives and issues of ordinary citizens. Local governance places significant value on local knowledge and interests, recognizing them as crucial components of democratic decision-making and essential for efficient and citizen-friendly administration. Democracy centers around meaningful participation and accountability, both of which are ensured by robust and dynamic local governments (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999).

2006). Ordinary citizens possess a greater familiarity with their local government when compared to state or national levels, and they have a stronger vested interest in the actions or inactions of the local government, as these directly impact their daily lives. Therefore, reinforcing local government is tantamount to fortifying democratic processes.

The federal system stands as a cornerstone concept in democracy, further enriched by the Indian Constitution's delineation of roles and authorities between the Union and the states. Notably, Parts XI and XII of the Indian Constitution oversee the administrative, legislative, and financial functions of both the Union and the states. Additionally, the Seventh (7th) Schedule of the Indian Constitution addresses the division of power between the Union and the states through the Union list (First List), State list (Second List), and Concurrent List (Third List). Furthermore,

the constitutional stature of local self-government has been enhanced by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 1992, which augment the federal character of democratic governance by decentralizing authority and administrative power to various levels of local bodies and institutions (Alok, 2023).

Comparative Analysis of South Korea, Parkistan, India, China, Japan and Singapore Decentralized Local Administrative System

South Korea's local administration system is a unitary state with a multi-tiered structure of local governments that have varying degrees of autonomy from the central government. Local governments are semi-autonomous, possessing both executive and legislative bodies, while the judiciary operates at both national and local levels. The system has evolved with a mix of decentralization and centralization, facing challenges like regional disparities and the tension between local needs and national interests.

Here's a more detailed comparative analysis:

1. Structure and Levels:

- **Unitary System:** South Korea operates under a unitary system, meaning the central government holds significant power over local governments.

- **Multi-Tiered Structure:** The country has a multi-tiered system of local governments, including metropolitan cities (gwangyeoksi), special cities (teukbyeolsi), special self-governing cities (teukbyeol-jachisi), provinces (do), and special self-governing provinces (teukbyeol jachido).

- **Local Autonomy:** While local governments have some autonomy, they are also considered administrative arms of the national government, leading to a degree of tension between local needs and national policies.

2. Evolution and Decentralization:

- **Early Decentralization Efforts:** Local autonomy was introduced in 1949 but was eliminated in 1961 following a military coup.

- **Delayed Decentralization:** Decentralization was later revived, with local elections introduced in the mid-1990s.

- **Centralization Tendencies:** Despite decentralization efforts, there have been instances where local governments have faced challenges related to administrative and fiscal capacity, leading to increased reliance on central government transfers and potential widening of regional disparities.

3. Key Features and Challenges:

- **Local Elections:** The introduction of local elections has led to the rise of local politicians and the development of local political arenas.

- **Fiscal Dependency:** Some local governments rely heavily on central government transfers, which can create a dependency and potentially hinder their ability to address local needs effectively.

- **Regional Disparities:** There are significant economic and development gaps between different regions in South Korea, which can be exacerbated by the existing administrative structure.

- **Tension between National and Local Interests:** Local officials face the challenge of balancing national policies with local needs and demands, sometimes leading to conflicts of interest and inconsistent behavior.

- **Environmental Policy:** Local governments play a crucial role in addressing environmental issues, such as pollution, but these issues may not always receive adequate attention at the national level.

4. Comparative Aspects:

- **Central vs. Local Power:** South Korea's unitary system contrasts with federal systems where local governments have greater autonomy and power.

- **Decentralization Models:** The extent and nature of decentralization in South Korea can be compared to other countries with varying degrees of decentralization, such as those with federal or regional governance structures.

5. Recent Developments:

- **Green New Deal:** The Korean government is implementing a Green New Deal to address climate change and reduce regional inequalities, integrating environmental and regional development goals.

- **Regional Balanced New Deal:** A key aspect of the Green New Deal is the Regionally Balanced New Deal, which aims to reduce regional inequalities and promote sustainable development.

In conclusion, South Korea's local administration system reflects a complex interplay between decentralization and centralization, with ongoing efforts to address regional disparities and promote sustainable development while navigating the inherent tensions between national and local interests.

Decentralization of local administration varies across the selected countries. Japan and India have well-established, multi-tiered systems with varying degrees of autonomy for local governments. China's system is characterized by political centralization and economic decentralization. South Korea has a history of fluctuating levels of decentralization, while Singapore operates with a highly centralized, city-state structure. Pakistan's system is a federal republic with constitutionally protected local governments.

Japan:

- Local government is structured with prefectures and municipalities, with municipalities primarily responsible for local services.

- The Local Autonomy Law (1947) grants broad administrative autonomy to local governments.

- A principle of municipal priority guides the distribution of functions between national, prefectural, and municipal governments.

- Decentralization efforts in the 1980s aimed to address disparities between Tokyo and other prefectures and reduce fiscal constraints.

China:

- The constitution outlines three levels of government, but in practice, five levels exist: provincial, prefecture, county, township, and village.

- China's system features political centralization and economic decentralization.

- Local governments have some autonomy in revenue and expenditure, allowing them to influence budget structures.

- The central government sets strategic direction while local officials develop policy details.

South Korea:

- Local autonomy was introduced in 1949 but was later eliminated and then reintroduced in the 1990s.

- The military coup in 1961 abolished local councils and resulted in central government appointments of local leaders.

- Further decentralization was pursued in the late 1990s to address economic issues and globalization.

- Revenue decentralization is found to improve citizens' trust in government in South Korea.

India:

- The 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (1992) established a three-tier Panchayati Raj system and urban local bodies.

- Local governments are responsible for planning, management, and resource allocation.

- The Panchayati Raj Act (1993) aimed to implement administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization.

- Some studies indicate that decentralization can positively impact human development.

Pakistan:

- A federal republic with national, provincial, and local tiers of government.

- Local government is protected by the constitution.

- Each province has legislation and ministries for implementing local government.

Singapore:

- A city-state with no devolved local or regional government.

- It is divided into five geographical districts: Central, North East, North West, South East, and North West.

Decentralization of local administration in South Korea, India, and Pakistan exhibits distinct characteristics influenced by their unique historical and political contexts. While all three countries have embraced decentralization as a governance strategy, the extent and nature of decentralization vary significantly. South Korea, after a period of centralized control, has gradually decentralized, with a focus on both political and fiscal aspects. India, through constitutional amendments, established a three-tier Panchayati Raj system, empowering local governments. Pakistan, despite constitutional provisions for local governments, has seen varying degrees of decentralization, often linked to military rule.

South Korea:

- **Historical Context:** South Korea's decentralization journey began with the introduction of local autonomy in 1949, but it was later eliminated and then reinstated following the military coup in 1961. According to ESCAP documents, it took nearly 50 years for the promises of local autonomy to be fully realized.

- **Phases of Decentralization:** The process gained momentum in the 1990s with the re-establishment of local councils and the election of both local council members and chief executives in 1995.

- **Focus:** The emphasis is on devolving administrative functions from the central government to local governments, with a gradual increase in local revenue autonomy.

- **Recent Trends:** Recent studies indicate that decentralizing revenue can improve citizens' trust in government by giving local governments more discretion in spending.

India:

- **Constitutional Framework:** The 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian constitution in 1992 were pivotal, establishing a three-tier Panchayati Raj system for rural areas and urban local bodies.

- **Three-Tier System:** This system involves village-level, intermediate-level, and district-level Panchayats, along with urban local bodies in urban areas.

- **Empowerment:** The amendments aimed to devolve power and responsibilities to these local bodies, enhancing their capacity to address local needs.

- **Decentralization of Functions:** Decentralization in India has involved a transfer of functions, finances, and functionaries to local governments.

Pakistan:

- **Federal Structure:** Pakistan is a federal republic with three tiers of government: national, provincial, and local.

- **Constitutional Protection:** Articles 32 and 140-A of the Constitution protect local governments.

- **Provincial Role:** Each province also has its own local government legislation and ministries responsible for implementation.

- **Military Influence:** Interestingly, local government has been historically stronger under military regimes than under democratic elected ones.

- **Varied Decentralization:** Decentralization in Pakistan has been characterized by periods of strong local government under military rule, with varying degrees of success.

- **Fiscal Centralization:** While there are provisions for local governments, fiscal centralization has been a persistent issue.

Local administration in India, particularly the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), presents a unique model of decentralized governance with a focus on grassroots participation. While aiming for democratic decentralization and local development, the system faces challenges related to effective devolution of power, financial autonomy, and capacity building. A comparative analysis with other systems would highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian model and offer insights for improvement.

Features of Indian Local Administration (Panchayati Raj):

- **Three-Tier Structure:** Gram Panchayats at the village level, Panchayat Samitis at the block level, and Zilla Parishads at the district level.

- **Constitutional Status:** The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 granted constitutional status to PRIs, aiming to strengthen local self-governance.

- **Elected Representatives:** Gram Sabha members (adult residents of the village) elect Panchayat members.

- **Reserved Constituencies:** Special representation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women.

- **Focus on Development:** PRIs are entrusted with responsibilities related to local development, including agriculture, health, sanitation, and education.

Comparative Analysis:

- **Devolution of Power:** While the 73rd Amendment aimed to devolve power, many states have not fully devolved functions, finances, and functionaries to the PRIs.

- **Fiscal Autonomy:** PRIs often struggle with limited financial resources and revenue generation, relying heavily on state and central government grants.

- **Capacity Building:** There's a need for strengthening the capacity of PRI members and officials through training and institutional support.

- **People's Participation:** Despite the emphasis on grassroots democracy, issues like lack of awareness, social inequalities, and political interference can hinder effective participation.

- **Role of Political Will:** Sustaining the PRI system requires strong political commitment and a conducive environment for democratic decentralization.

Comparison with other models:

- **Decentralization in Other Countries:** Many African and Asian countries have also implemented decentralization, but the extent and nature of decentralization vary significantly.

- **Comparison with UK and USA:** A comparative study of India, UK, and USA highlights the differences in the structure and functioning of local governments across different political systems.

Conclusion:

India's Panchayati Raj system, while a significant step towards decentralization, faces challenges in achieving its full potential. A comparative analysis with other models can provide valuable insights for strengthening local governance in India, emphasizing the need for greater devolution of power, fiscal autonomy, capacity building, and people's participation.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts Democratic Participatory and Efficient Service theories as its theoretical foundations. Democratic Participatory Theory as championed by Desmon (1988) local government exists basically to promote democratic governance and citizens' participation in Government at the local government level in order to bring government nearer to the people. This theoretical foundation is premised on the justification for the existence of local government on the basis of its relevance as an essential part of democratic-participatory and efficiency theories to compare and analyses the Local Government systems in south Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan China and Singapore.

Methodology

This paper therefore aligns with the above conceptual framework. The work is qualitative, primary and secondary in its approach to discussing the comparative study of the Singapore, south Korea, India, China, Japan and Pakistan decentralized Local Government administrative system. It relies on existing extant literature in discussing the major themes that are germane to the work.

Conclusion

In this study several questions were investigated regarding the development impacts of new local government system in Pakistan with a particular on service delivery. Though the initial results and analyses of the new system is not encouraging yet it is hoped that current reforms is a step in the right direction.

Decentralization has not been fully implemented as it is found in the LGO (2001). Many of the institutions and monitoring committees like Parent Teachers Associations (PTA), Citizen-Police liaison committees etc. that the LGO (2001) provide for have either not been formed or ineffective in performing their functions. In districts where these committees are operating it is generally found that their members are unaware of their functions and responsibilities. Lack of capacity at the local level is the biggest problem facing decentralization in Pakistan. The

decentralization plan was implemented before the requisite capacity being developed for it at the local level.

Discrepancies can be found in administrative, political and fiscal decentralization. In the areas where political and administrative authority is devolved fiscal authority has been held by the Provincial government which enables the provincial government to exercise significant control over both local administration and local finances. Fiscal decentralization to the local level is limited and nominal because district governments still have the same conventional limited tax collection authorities and spending remains at the whim of provincial government. Politicians are more concerned with patronage and consolidating their vote bank with help of targeted favors to privileged groups rather than providing public goods and services that would benefit majority of the citizens.

One of the underlying reasons for devolving authority to the local level was to make the decision-makers and service providers more accountable to public. The accountability of the service providers to the elected representatives and of the representatives to the public is not working as envisaged by LGO (2001). While in theory the officials at the local level are responsible to the elected representatives, they can easily escape this accountability because the elected representatives do not have the powers of appointment, postings and transfers of the officials working at the district level. These officials consider themselves to be the employees of provincial government and not the district government.

Different tiers of government and government functionaries are involved in delivering the same services. Credit or blame can not be assigned to any of them and they have this advantage of pointing their fingers towards each other when things go wrong and unfortunately this happens quite often. Bureaucrats are employed by the provincial government; naturally they are bound to the provincial instructions and provincial governments being their employer, holds APT powers over them. The senior staff members can be under the provincial pressure to comply with the transfer instructions of the subordinate staff. Provincial authorities try to keep a tight control on authority and resources of the Local Governments. Federal Political Authorities have the same approach towards provinces. Nazim's/Mayor control the over the EDOs and local police head is insignificant.

A more lenient examination of decentralization reforms may come up with somewhat encouraging picture, specifically when the 'infancy' factor is brought under the consideration. As stated in the first chapter, this is not to say that the new system is absolutely futile. Notwithstanding all the flaws explicated in the analysis, the new system shows great signs of hope for better prospects. High level of engagement of the public with the new local governments, especially the union councils, is encouraging. Services from Tehsils i.e. the middle tier in particular seem to be doing well. There is a continuing increase in net school enrolment among 5-9 year old children. While the increase since 2002 is more into private schools, government schools are apparently catering more for girls and children from vulnerable households. There is little evidence of increased public willingness to contact the police; the increase in those who said they would use the police for a problem of personal safety was confined to non-vulnerable households. The police continue to have a bad reputation among the public. While there is evidence that people believe the courts ought to help them, the use of the courts remains low.

Recommendations

Policy implications of this study are augmented by the recommendations of policy analysts who investigated the devolution reforms. The local government tiers of district government, tehsil administration and union administration desperately need harmonized planning and coordinated provision of services. These are imperative conditions without which, local governance can not make efficient use of resources. For the formulation of a system of fiscal transfers between different levels of government, it will be important to ensure transparency and to give local governments the authority to raise additional resources. Awareness and education is required to be disseminated in the public about the devolution, their rights, and privileges and what they should expect of newly elected representatives and the local government executive (Cyan and Porter 2004).

As suggested by Cockcroft et al (2005), the strongest individual factor in users' satisfaction was the user report of receiving medicines in government facilities. Reducing leakage of medicines and transparent accountability measures, which allow the clients to know the exact situation about medicines in the facilities, can help in this situation. A strong customer-oriented strategy would be a better magic bullet to enhance the relationship between physicians and other healthcare professionals and their patients. The establishment of independent Public Service Commissions with a supervisory role in hiring and career management of key service delivery personnel, as well as improvements to the legal and regulatory framework for procurement to give citizens access to important public records, are examples of institutional capacity building mechanisms that would reduce the tendency of political patronage (Hasnain, 2005).

International experience also demonstrates that laws that expand individuals' access to information, especially precise information about specific government activities, can significantly enhance public pressure for better services. For instance, in nations like India, Uganda, the Philippines, and Ukraine, using Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys and making the results public have had some success raising awareness. According to Williamson et al. (2005), local government administrators need to have the right tools and resources. Giving local government managers APT authority can improve the behavior of local government employees. Innovative ways to attract employees to work in remote locations should be devised, such as offering more allowances or constructing residential facilities for teachers and healthcare professionals in rural places along with all the amenities they need. The provincial governments, monitoring committees, and district health and education personnel can all perform checks and balances. The attendance of employees should be observed by communities and union councilors. To notify the public, attendance lists could be posted on the notice board of the school or health facility. For public consumers who want to voice their dissatisfaction with the performance of educators and healthcare professionals, complaint cells can be established in districts and TMA councils (Williamson et al 2005).

The Local Government Development Program (LGDP) in Uganda was created to provide a common set of standards for judging performance and at the same time to channel resources to local governments in ways that allowed local councilors to decide

how they would be allocated. All local governments have access to a formula-based local government grant, however their access and level of funding is dependent on the annual local-government assessment. Local governments are assessed on their corporate performance, against minimum requirements and benchmarks related to areas such as planning, budgeting, financial management, engineering capacity. The LGDP framework has provided a strong incentive for local governments to upgrade their corporate performance (ADB/DFID/World Bank 2004). A somewhat similar system, tailored in accordance with local political, social, and economical conditions, of grants from the centre can stimulate the pace of development in Pakistan.

Decentralization itself is neither good or bad. It is a means to an end. Successful decentralization improves efficiency and responsiveness of public sector. Literate populace and educated leadership are also necessary for this. A similarly favorable environment, including civil society, economic stability, capacity, and awareness, is also necessary. The debate above leads one to the conclusion that Pakistan's present local government reform plan is an attempt to transfer authority to elected local governments in order to speed up the shift to good governance.

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